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CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF PHYSICIANS FOR
STERILIZATION OPERATIONS
By JUSTIN MILLER and GORDON DEAN
(From the March issue of the American Bar Association Journal).
In California, between 1910 and
1929, six thousand and fifty-five ster-
ilization operations have been per-
formed in public institutions.
About three thousand such opera-
tions have been performed in other
States during the same period.
How many operations have been
privately performed, it is impossible
to state.
"The operations most frequently
used for this purpose are that of
vasectomy as applied to males and
salpingectomy as applied to females.
We are assured by members of the
medical profession who have develop-
ed these techniques that, unlike cas-
tration and spaying, vasectomy and
salpingectomy do not desexualize the
individual or produce other physical
or mental changes except such as
may grow out of a realization that
the child-producing function had
been destroyed. The constitutional-
ity of statutes providing for the
sterilization of the unfit has been
established in a number of states and
by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The courts have been more
reluctant about conceding the con-
stitutionality of statutes providing
for the sterilization of criminals."
(For a full discussion of the law in-
volved in the preceding introductory
paragraphs see, "The Law and
Human Sterilization" by Otis H.
Castle, 53 Reports of Am. Bar. Assn.
556).
"In most of the statutes which
provide for the sterilization of the
unfit in state institutions, there have
been incorporated provisions, absolv-
ing from civil and criminal liability,
those who perform such operations.
As yet, none of these provisions have
been passed upon by courts of re-
view. Presumably, in order to avoid
liability, the provisions of the stat-
utes must be strictly complied with."
"Ordinarily the purpose is therap-
eutic (A distinction between eugeni-
cal and therapeutic purposes is im-
portant under some of the steriliza-
tion statutes; Indiana Stats. 1927,
Ch. 241, Sec. 6; Utah Stats. 1925,
Ch. 82, Sec. 6; Mississippi Stats.
1928, Ch. 294, Sec. 6; Virginia Ann.
Code 1924, Ch. 46b, Sec. 1095m, (P.
569). 'Medical' and 'therapeutic' are
probably synonymous. See Williams
v. Scudder, 102 Ohio State 305, 131
N. E. 481, 483; Gould Med. Dict. (2d
ed) p. 1380.), rather then eugenic,
nevertheless there are cases of vol-
untary private sterilizations where
the purpose is to cut off a strain of
defective germ-plasm, as in the case
of a diagnosis of hereditary insanity
or in case of the marriage of two
persons each with a pronounced fam-
ily history of cancer. We may safe-
ly assume, no doubt, that in some
cases the purpose of the operation
is merely to remove danger of preg-
nancy."
"An operation for sterilization
would clearly result in criminal lia-
bility in many cases. Death result-
ing from such a cause, if no justifi-
cation or excuse were present, would
make the perpetrator guilty of a
homicide, varying in degree accord-
ing to the malice and intent in his
mind at the time of the act."
"The usual considerations in de-
termining liability for homicide
would be pertinent here. Gross negli-
gence, general criminal intent, the
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fact of being engaged in the corn-
mission of another felony, might
each be sufficient to supply the ele-
ment of intent. (Gross Negligence.
See note 61 L.R.A. 287, 289. See
also State v. Reynolds, 42 Kan. 320,
22 Pac. 410, 16 Am. St. Rep. 483
(1889) and note; State v. Hardister,
38 Ark. 605, 42 Am. Rep. 5 (1882).
General Criminal Intent. Clark and
Marshall Crimes (3d ed) Sec. 243;
State v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128, 95 Am.
Dec. 776 (1868); State v. Lodge, 9
Houst (Del) 542, 33 Atl. 312 (1892).
Homicide in Commission of Felony.
I Hale P. C. 473; 21 Mich. L. Rev.
95. See Clark and Marshall Crimes
(3d ed) 195, and cases collected in
63 L. R. A. 353. At present, Utah is
the only state which makes an un-
lawful sterilization operation a fel-
ony; Utah Laws of 1925, Chap. 82,
Sec. 7. In two states unlawful steril-
ization operations are misdemean-
ors; Iowa Stats. 1924. Code of Iowa
1927, Ch. 168 Sec. 3364. When origi-
nally passed in 1915 the section was
2600s (5). Kansas Stats. 1917, Chap.
299, Sec. 7. Revised Stats. 1923, Chap.
76, Sec. 177.) The main considera-
tion would be that of causation, and
death resulting.
"In similar manner such an oper-
ation might result in liability for
mayhem or maiming. This would be
clearly true in case of castration be-
cause the effect of the operation is to
change the entire physical character
of the individual. (Castration: Bou-
vier Law Dict. 1 Hawk P. C. 107;
Bishop Crim. Law. (9th ed.) Sec.
1001.)"
"In cases both of homicide and
mayhem, even the consent of the
person castrated would not 'serve to
excuse the physician, for it is clear-
ly established that consent of the in-
jured person in this type of case does
not operate to prevent criminal lia-
bility. (See People v. Clough, 17
Wendell 351, 31 Am. Dec. 303 (1837)
for a full discussion, and Rex. v.
Wright, 1 East P. C. 396, Co. Lltt.
127a. In abortion cases where death
results, the homicide is not justifi-
able. State v. Magnell, 3 Penn.
(Del) 307, 51 Al. 606 (1901); State
v. Moore, 25 Iowa 128, 95 Am. Dec.
776 (1868). The same is true where
death is the result of a duel. Re-
gina v. Barronet, Dears C. C. 51.)"
"An interesting subject of inquiry
is opened up when we attempt to
apply these principles of law to the
modern sterilization operations of
vasectomy and salpingectomy. As
has been pointed out already they
are entirely different from the cruel
and despoiling operations known to
the common law. It is true that in
at least one recent case the use of
the modern operations was condemn-
ed as constituting cruel and unusual
punishment. (Hendricks v. Mickle,
262 Fed. 677, D. C. D. Nev. 1918;
Davis v. Berry, 216 Fed. 413, D. C. S.
D. Iowa 1914. See also dissenting
opinion in Smith v. Command 231
Mich. 409, 204 N. W. 140, 142
(1925).)"
"In recent years a few of the states
which have adopted sterilization
statutes have incorporated therein
two types of prohibitory provisions
with regard to the performance ol
non-therapeutic private operations
of sterilization.
"First, the statutes of Indiana,
(Indiana Stats. 1927, Ch. 241, Sec.
6), Utah (Utah Stats. 1925, Ch. 82,
Sec. 6) Mississippi (Mississippi
Stats. 1928, Ch. 294, Sec. 6) and Vir-
ginia (Virginia Ann. Code 1924, Ch.
46b, Sec. 1095m, (p. 569.), make the
following provision for therapeutt
operations of sterilization:
'Nothing in this act shall be con-
strued so as to prevent the medical
or surgical treatment for sound the-
rapeutic reasons of any person in
this state, by a physician or surgeon
licensed in this state which treat-
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ment may incidentally involve the
nullification or destruction of the re-
productive functions.'
"The Indiana statute makes a fur-
ther qualification, 'provided that
such treatment shall be that which
is recognized as legal and approved
after due process of law.'
"It will be noted that this type of
provision does not make such oper-
ation a criminal offense, and no pun-
ishment is provided. It is probably
at most a provision designed to
avoid civil liability except where the
operation is non-therapeutic, or pos-
sibly even where the physician is un-
licensed, or the operation 'primarily'
(as distinguished from 'incidentally')
involves the nullification or destruc-
tion of the reproductive functions.
If the operation did contain any of
the above impliedly prohibited cir-
cumstances, an attorney might well
hesitate to advise a physician that
he might safely perform the opera-
tion in a state which had such a
statute. Especially would this be
true in Indiana. (Indiana is one of
the states in which consent to an ab-
ortion is not a bar to civil recovery
against the physician by the patient.
Martin v. Hardesty, 163 N. W. 610,
(Ind. 1928), but see Courtney v.
Clinton 18 Ind. App. 620, 48 N. E.
799 (1897).
"Second, in three states, Iowa
(Iowa Stats. 1924. Code of Iowa
1927. Ch. 168. Sec. 3364. When or-
iginally passed in 1915 the section
was 2600s (5), Kansas, (Kansas
Stats. 1917, Chap. 299, Sec. 7. Re-
vised Stats. 1923, Chap. 76, Sec. 177),
and Utah, (Utah Laws of 1925,
Chap. 82, Sec. 7.) a direct penal pro-
vision is found:
'Except as authorized by this act'
(the act refers to the sterilization of
the unfit in state institutions,)
'every person who shall perform, en-
courage, assist in, or otherwise pro-
mote the performance of either of
the operations' (vasectomy a n d
salpingectomy) 'for the purpose of
destroying the powers of procrea-
tion, unless performance of such
operation is a medical necessity,
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.'
"Utah is the only state which in-
corporates in its acts both of the
above provisions."
"In those states which have penal
provisions regulating liability for
performance of s u c h operations
without therapeutic or medical justi-
fication, liability is determined
thereby. Where the state has noth-
ing but a mayhem statute which fol-
lows the common law concept, it is
very doubtful if the modern opera-
tions for sterilization could be
classed as criminal. Where the
statute speaks in terms of 'rendering
useless' a member or organ of a
human being, there is possibility of a
decision either denying or establish-
ing liability. In any event malice
seems to be an element essential to
criminal liability in such a case."
As to civil liability the authors dif-
ferentiate between cases where the
plaintiff has consented to the opera-
tion and those where the operation
has been performed without or
against the plaintiff's consent.
They state that although some
cases are on record involving oper-
ations which incidentally resulted in
sterility, no case has been found in
which a person who has consented to
a sterilization operation has brought
suit against a physician.
The authors draw an analogy be-
tween illegal sterilization operations
and illegal abortions.
"Appellate courts of this country
have considered nine cases of abor-
tions where suit was brought by or
for one who had consented to the
operation. In four of the jurisdic-
tions, Federal, (Hunter v. Wheate,
289 Fed. 604 (C. A. D. C. 1923),
Kentucky, (Goldnamer v. O'Brien 98
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Ky. 569, 36 L. R. A. 715, 33 S. W.
831, 56 Am. St. Rep. 378 (1896). This
case is approved in Bigelow on
Torts, p. 41), Massachusetts, (Wa-
claw Scadificz v. Cantor, 154 N. E.
251 (Mass. 1926), and New York.
(Larocque v. Conheim, 42 Misc. 613,
87 N. Y. S. 625 (1904), no recovery
was allowed, on the principle that an
illegal transaction cannot be made
the basis of an action by one who is
a party thereto. In five of the juris-
dictions, Alabama, (Hancock v. Hul-
lett, 203 Ala. 272, 82 So. 552 (1919),
Indiana, (Martin v. Hardesty, 163 N.
W. 610, (Ind. 1928), but see Court-
ney v. Clinton 18 Ind. App. 620, 48
N. E. 799 (1897), Maine, (Lembo v.
Donnell, 116 Me. 505, 101 Atl. 469
(1917), Ohio, (Milliken v. Hedde-
sheimer, 144 N. E. 264. (Ohio, 1926).
and Wisconsin, (Miller v. Bayer, 94
Wis. 123, 68 N. W. 869 (1896) recov-
ery was allowed on the theory that
'because of the state's interest,
neither party has a right to make
any agreement to sacrifice his life
or suffer injury to his person, and
any such agreement is void.'
"In those states in which there is
no penal provision prohibiting a
sterilization operation by the mod-
ern methods, the general rule of tort
law would seem to apply and the
consent of the party to submit to the
operation should be a complete
shield against civil liability on the
part of the operating physician, pro-
vided the operation was performed
without negligence."
If a physician performs an oper-
ation different from the one con-
sented to, plaintiff can recover
(Cuthriel v. Protestant Hospital, an
unreported Ohio case, cited in the
notes to Kinkaid on Torts, Sec. 375).
Where an operation is performed
upon a person without the patient's
consent, express or implied, it is un-
lawful (Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn.
261, 104. N. W. 12, 111 Am. St. Rep.
462, 1 L. R. A. (NS) 439 (1905) and
note. See also note 26 A. L. R. 1036;
2 Cal. L. Rev. 312; and Rolater v.
Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 Pac. 196,
(1914).
If the person operated upon is in-
capable of giving legal consent, the
physician is of course liable.
It has been held that if the wife
gives consent, the husband's con-
sent is either not necessary or is im-
plied.
Where a sterilization operation is
performed on a minor without the
consent of the parent, except the
factual situation presents a clear
case of emergency (Moss v. Rish-
worth 191 S. W. 843 (Tex. 1917), af-
firmed 222 S. W. 225 (1920). See
Browning v. Hoffman, 90 W. Va. 568,
111 S. E. 492 (1922) Luka v. Lowrie,
170 Mich. 122, 136 N. W. 1106, 41
L. R. A. (NS) 290 (1912) at 135),
the physician is liable.
Where before marriage, a wife is
sterilized by a private operation and
does not disclose the fact to her
husband before marriage, annulment
should be granted on the ground of
fraud, (Turner v. Avery, 92 N. J. Eq.
473, 113 Atl. 710 (1921).
The article contains quite a num-
ber of case references not mention-
ed in this excerpt and the reader is
referred to the original article for
further material on the question.
